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NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

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4 March 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

**SUBJECT: NRO**

The purpose of this memorandum is to identify the basic aspects of the present National Reconnaissance Program that require modification to bring about a harmonious cooperation and the establishment of a successful National Reconnaissance Program.

1. On the assumption that the national interest is served by the National Reconnaissance Program drawing on the full capabilities of both the Department of Defense and CIA, it is proposed that certain adjustments be made, not only in the manner in which the original agreement of 13 March 1963 was originally conceived, but also in the manner in which that agreement has come to be carried out.

2. As a point of departure, it can be seen from the chart prepared by DNRO that the role of CIA, other than those elements of Program B under the direct command of DNRO, are considered to be of such a minor nature as to warrant only a box labeled "other". It would serve little

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purpose at this juncture to state that the chart in question fails to reflect many other aspects of the National Reconnaissance Program.

3. There are four primary areas where a modification of present arrangements is necessary to bring about an effective National Reconnaissance Program.

a. Under the existing agreement, while there is extensive language which could be used to support the view that CIA had an important role in the reconnaissance program, the fact is that the sweeping and all-inclusive authority vested in DNRO in Paragraphs II and IV of that agreement effectively relegate CIA's role to the very minimum participation. The allocation to CIA of the position of Deputy DNRO has not been an effective counterweight.

b. Furthermore, the lack of provision in the agreement for a formal joint collaboration (Executive Committee) for policy and budgetary determination and guidance of the NRP further has also tended to erode

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the Agency's participation and potential contribution to the program.

c. Under the terms of the existing agreement the Agency's direct participation in the National Reconnaissance Program is provided for through the establishment of a Director of Program B. This individual, on the rolls of CIA, is nevertheless explicitly in DNRO's line command (see DOD chart). It is this situation which has contributed to certain management complications which have been labeled "coming through the walls of CIA" and which demands a different solution.

d. A clearly defined procedure for allocation of responsibility for project research, development and procurement accompanied by appropriate funding requires to be developed.

3. There has been prepared a chart, together with an explanatory memorandum, which it is believed will satisfactorily resolve the basic issues set forth above. It is further believed that if the basic principles which are reflected in this new chart are acceptable that it could then form the framework on which a new and comprehensive agreement could be negotiated to supersede the existing agreement of 13 March 1963.